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Summary 
In recent years, Torres Strait Islanders have made a number of calls for greater 
governmental autonomy within the Australian federal system. This paper 
examines a number of these calls and government responses to them. It observes 
that progress towards greater autonomy has been slow and difficult and relates 
this to unresolved issues pertaining to three underlying analytic questions: from 
whom, for whom and for or over what is autonomy being sought? 
The paper argues that there have been, and still are, difficult unresolved issues 
relating to all three questions which Torres Strait Islanders need to address if 
autonomy is to be progressed. It also argues that the Australian federal system 
can accommodate greater autonomy in Torres Strait, though it will require some 
real innovation in Australian federal governance. 
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Introduction 
Torres Strait is a confined area of islands and sea between Cape York, the 
Australian mainland’s northernmost promontory, and Papua New Guinea’s Fly 
River Delta and Western Province (see Fig. 1). The Indigenous inhabitants of the 
area are known today as Torres Strait Islanders, although this term had no 
currency prior to colonial settlement as the inhabitants were more attached to 
individual islands and were divided into three language groups. Colonial 
settlement began in earnest in the 1860s and 1870s, with the arrival of pearlers 
and missionaries. The initial British claim to Australia in 1770 had not covered 
Torres Strait, and it was not until 1872 and 1879 that the islands and sea were 
annexed to the Australian colony of Queensland. 
Fig. 1. The Torres Strait Region 
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In pre-colonial times, the 4–5,000 inhabitants of Torres Strait had more links 
with their Melanesian horticulturist cousins to the north than with the rather 
different Australian Aboriginal hunter-gatherers to the south. With incorporation 
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into the colony of Queensland, however, Torres Strait’s political future became 
more linked to the south. After the federation of Australia in 1901, both the 
Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Queensland could claim a 
jurisdictional interest in Torres Strait; though initially it was the Queensland 
State government which took the greater interest. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Queensland State government 
established a dual system of local government in Torres Strait. One element was a 
mainstream local government, known as Torres Shire, established under the 
Queensland local government Act. This provided local government for the centre 
of colonial settlement in Torres Strait on Thursday Island (Waiben). The second 
element of the dual system was Island Councils established for the other 15 or so 
islands of the Strait with permanent Indigenous inhabitants. The populations of 
these ‘outlying’ communities remained almost exclusively Indigenous, apart from 
a few missionaries and supervisory State government employees. Control over 
Islanders under this dual local government system was substantial, and 
movement away from the outlying communities to the colonial centre of 
settlement in the Strait, or to places further afield in Australia, was severely 
restricted. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, control over Islanders and their living 
locations was gradually relaxed. Many Islanders took the opportunity to move to 
the centre of colonial settlement in Torres Strait on Thursday Island, or to places 
further south in Australia, particularly along the north Queensland coast. Partly 
through intermarriage with other groups as a result of this migration, the 
population of Islanders grew rapidly during the second half of the twentieth 
century to perhaps four or five times the pre-colonial level. Islanders living ‘away’ 
from Torres Strait also came to outnumber those living at ‘home’; the latter 
seeming to remain around the 5–6,000 level (see Fig. 2). Even though controls 
over Islanders were relaxed, other aspects of the dual system of local government 
in Torres Strait remained intact. Eligibility for elected office on Island Councils 
continued to be restricted to Indigenous people who had two years residence on 
the particular island.1 Those who moved south consequently had some difficulty 
in continuing their participation in the political life of their home islands, 
although from the mid 1960s they could vote for local, State and Commonwealth 
representatives in the areas of Queensland where they were residing. Those who 
moved to Thursday Island also had difficulties. They too could vote from the mid 
1960s for representatives in the Queensland and Commonwealth parliaments, 
but were unable to vote at the local government level for either their home Island 
Council or for Torres Shire, as the latter had been in the hands of a non-elected 
administrator since 1952 and did not become elected again until 1991. 
With this background in mind, let us turn to January 1988, as the bicentenary of 
British settlement in Australia was being celebrated in Sydney and elsewhere 
around Australia. In Torres Strait on Thursday Island a meeting of Islanders was 
declaring themselves to be an ‘independent people’ who did not accept the ‘system 
of laws, politics and economy’ imposed on them by ‘the British colonial forces’ 
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Fig. 2. Torres Strait Islanders: Geographic distribution 1880–1996 
 
and who were ‘entitled to full recognition’ of their own ‘institutions, culture and 
territories’ (O’Rourke 1988: Attachment A). This ‘statement of principle’, or ‘call 
for sovereign independence’ as it was later called, built on another statement 
made six months earlier by the chairman of the Island Co-ordinating Council 
(ICC)—the overarching organisation of the by then 17 Island Councils in Torres 
Strait, sanctioned by the Queensland State government (O’Rourke 1988: 1).2 In 
this earlier statement, the ICC had reconfirmed ‘its longstanding resolution to 
claim sovereignty over the land, sea and air in Torres Strait’ and demanded that 
‘all existing crown land and leases on crown land be vested in the ICC for the 
benefit of immediate and future Torres Strait Islanders’. It had also declared that 
‘ the ICC must control all funds to the Torres Strait through direct grants from 
Treasury’ with ‘no involvement by other departments in the disbursement of 
funds’ and that ‘the ICC must have the right to raise revenue in the same manner 
as a State or Territory’ (O’Rourke 1988: Attachment B). 
These statements in July 1987 and January 1988 were, in many ways, quite 
strong assertions of political autonomy rights for Torres Strait and Torres Strait 
Islanders. The autonomy being sought appeared to be within the Australian 
federation, but it was at a reasonably high level, roughly commensurate with that 
of the existing Australian States and Territories and involving a claim of 
Indigenous sovereignty. 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
18
80
19
15
19
21
19
26
19
31
19
36
19
41
19
46
19
51
19
56
19
61
19
66
19
71
19
76
19
81
19
86
19
91
19
96
Year
TS
I 
po
pu
la
ti
on Rest Aust.
Rest Qld.
Strait
4 SANDERS AND ARTHUR 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
The autonomy sought by Torres Strait Islanders in 1987 and 1988 was not 
granted, either by the Australian Commonwealth government or by the 
Queensland State government. In the years since, however, both those 
governments have had to revisit the issue of greater autonomy for Torres Strait in 
the face of persistent, if fairly gentle, demands. In 1993, for example, in a 
prestigious nationwide Boyer lecture, the then Chairman of the ICC, Getano Lui 
(Jnr), called for a ‘new status’ for Torres Strait within the Australian system of 
government, perhaps to be negotiated by the centenary of federation in 2001. He 
wondered about the possibility of a ‘specific island territory’ and noted that 
Australia already had three such entities in Norfolk, Christmas and Cocos-Keeling 
islands, each with their own ‘tailor-made local constitutions’. There is ‘no reason’, 
he argued, ‘why a Torres Strait regional government cannot be devised’ (Lui 1994: 
69–70). 
The idea of autonomy in Torres Strait has persisted over recent years, but the 
centenary of Australian federation has come and gone, with only slight progress 
towards a new governmental status. In this paper we look at some of the issues 
that have arisen in this recent quest for autonomy in Torres Strait and at why 
progress towards that goal has been somewhat slow and difficult. The discussion 
is organised to address three analytic questions (which overlap to some degree): 
from whom, for whom, and for or over what is autonomy being sought? We begin, 
however, with some more background discussion of calls for autonomy and 
existing and suggested governance structures both before and since 1987–88. 
Calls for autonomy, and existing and proposed governance 
structures 
The call for autonomy in 1987–88 was not the first made by Torres Strait 
Islanders. Between 1976 and 1981 the issue was raised persistently by the Torres 
United Party (TUP), an organisation which by its own account was ‘formed by 
Islanders to represent the traditional island communities of Torres Strait, and 
Torres Strait Islanders forced to lived on mainland Australia in search of 
employment’ (Beckett 1987: 204). As those living away from Torres Strait have 
become an increasingly significant proportion of Torres Strait Islanders in recent 
years, there have, at times, been related tensions in the autonomy movement. 
Although the TUP claimed to represent both geographic parts of the Islander 
population, it was in fact primarily an organisation of people living away. It was 
based in the city of Townsville on the Queensland coast, over 1000 kilometres 
south of Torres Strait and, as it had few resources, its engagement with Islanders 
in the Strait was inevitably limited. 
The leader of the TUP, Carlemo Wacando, was in fact in dispute with the Island 
Council on his native Erub (Darnley Island), while at the same time pursuing a 
claim of Islander sovereignty over Erub in the Australian courts (Beckett 1987: 
205). That court case was eventually lost in 1981, in a judgment of the full bench 
of the High Court of Australia, and with the loss both the TUP and Wacando faded 
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from the political scene. Another court case quickly arose, however, this time 
claiming common law title to land on Mer (Murray Island), rather than 
sovereignty. Again the case was primarily pursued by an Islander living in 
Townsville, Eddie Mabo, who was also in dispute with the Island Council on his 
home island (Beckett 1994).3 Mabo’s court case, however, was successful; 
although it did take until 1992 to be finalised and Mabo did not live to hear the 
revolutionary High Court judgment which recognised common law native title in 
Australia (Sharp 1996; Stephenson & Ratnapala 1993). Mabo’s name is now a 
symbol of calls for Torres Strait Islander recognition and autonomy, and indeed 
for the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ institutions more generally within the 
Australian legal and political systems. 
One salient feature of the 1987 and 1988 calls for autonomy, in comparison with 
these others, was that they had the backing of elected Islander politicians located 
within the Strait, as well as that of self-appointed Islander activists based on the 
Australian mainland.4 Those making the calls were elected members of the Island 
Councils, long established and recognised by the Queensland State government. 
On one account, these Island Councils had had some degree of ‘control’ or 
‘autonomy’ over individual island affairs since the late 1930s (Beckett 1987: 55). 
Some within those Island Councils had also, since that time, been sanctioned to 
come together as an officially-recognised overarching group, the Island Advisory 
Council (IAC). But they had not, in the past, made much use of the IAC as a 
platform either to speak out to Australia on Torres Strait affairs as a whole or to 
demand changes to their governmental status within the Australian federation. 
With the transformation of the IAC into the ICC in 1984, this seemed to change. 
The Island Council chairpersons, who were all now part of this reformed, State-
government-endorsed political structure, were beginning to enunciate their own 
calls for greater autonomy for Torres Strait, including from the very State 
government that had created and sanctioned the ICC. This was a significant act of 
political development and assertiveness. However, it was, in many ways, events at 
the Commonwealth, rather than the State level of Australian government which 
were giving rise to this assertiveness, and on which it would have its greatest 
impact. It is to these events at the Commonwealth level that we now turn. 
The Australian Commonwealth Labor government elected in March 1983 had not 
enjoyed particularly good relations with Indigenous people during its first two 
terms in office. It had backed away from an election commitment to uniform 
national land rights and in the process had also disbanded the National 
Aboriginal Conference (NAC), a national government-sponsored elected 
Indigenous advisory body which had been in existence since 1977. After its re-
election for a third term in July 1987, the Commonwealth Labor government set 
about repairing its relations with Indigenous people. It developed the idea of an 
Australia-wide elected Indigenous people’s commission, which would be built 
from a regional representative base and have significant executive power in 
Commonwealth Indigenous affairs. Torres Strait was identified as one potential 
and rather unique region for the new commission. In the process of agreeing to be 
part of Labor’s new commission, the Torres Strait Indigenous leaders convinced 
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the Commonwealth to make members of the existing State-endorsed ICC also 
members of the new Commonwealth body, rather than having direct separate 
elections as in all the other regions. The members of the ICC would thus become 
representatives not only on an established Queensland State government Islander 
body but also on a new Commonwealth government Indigenous body, the Torres 
Strait Regional Council (TSRC) of the national Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (ATSIC).5 
There was, however, a shortcoming with this representative arrangement, which 
related to Indigenous people living in areas of Torres Strait not covered by the 
Queensland government’s ICC and Island Council system. Since 1984, the ICC 
had had an eighteenth member, who was not an Island Council chairperson, but 
rather was elected to represent Indigenous people living on the northern half of 
Thursday Island.6 But increasing numbers of Indigenous people were also 
beginning to live on the southern side of Thursday Island, and on two other 
nearby islands without Island Councils, and they too needed to be represented on 
the new Commonwealth body. Two directly elected positions on the TSRC were 
created to represent these people, so that the TSRC would have 20 members, 
compared to the 18-member ICC. 
In 1994, in response to further Islander pressure, the TSRC was upgraded within 
ATSIC to become an authority. The new Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) 
was unique within the ATSIC system Australia-wide (see Sanders 1995). It 
represented a significant new form of political autonomy for Indigenous people in 
Torres Strait, but it was not one with which many Islanders were finally or fully 
satisfied, nor one which was anything like a State or Territory within the 
Australian federation. The push for greater autonomy in Torres Strait continued, 
and in 1996 a newly elected Coalition Commonwealth government responded by 
establishing a Commonwealth parliamentary inquiry into greater autonomy for 
Torres Strait, to be carried out by the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (HRSCATSIA). The first 
two terms of reference for HRSCATSIA were to inquire into ‘whether the people of 
the Torres Strait would benefit from a greater degree of autonomy’ and ‘if so, what 
forms a greater degree of autonomy should take’. HRSCATSIA’s third term of 
reference was concerned with the ‘implications’ such greater autonomy might 
have for ‘Torres Strait Islanders resident outside the Torres Strait region’ and 
whether ATSIC or TSRA should ‘represent the interests of such residents’ 
(HRSCATSIA 1996: 1). 
When HRSCATSIA reported to the Commonwealth Parliament in August 1997, it 
recommended the establishment of a ‘Torres Strait Regional Assembly’ which 
would represent ‘all residents of the Torres Strait’ and be a joint statutory 
creation of the Commonwealth and Queensland parliaments (HRSCATSIA 1997: 
52). The proposed body, HRSCATSIA argued, should replace not only the ICC and 
the TSRA, but also the Torres Shire. The Island Councils, however, were to be left 
in place, funded through the assembly. The proposed assembly would thus 
become a general representative institution, open to all residents, for the whole of 
Torres Strait. It would also be a local government for the major centre of mixed 
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population settlement on Thursday Island and an overseer and funder of Island 
Councils in outlying areas. Support for this suggestion of multiple roles for the 
proposed assembly was not forthcoming; Islanders from a number of different 
organisational and geographic contexts were unsure that this was the way to 
proceed. 
Islanders associated with Torres Shire did not like the idea of the Shire 
disappearing as a local government, while the Island Councils remained. Nor did 
they like the idea of the proposed regional assembly acting as a local government 
for Thursday Island but having a majority of its elected members from outlying 
areas with their own separate Island Council local governments (see Sanders 
2000). HRSCATSIA did not seem to appreciate that Islanders had become 
attached to Torres Shire as a local government institution during the 1990s. 
Although the Shire had once been dominated by non-Indigenous interests, it had 
proven, since its re-election in 1991, to be increasingly open to Islander interests. 
The Mayor since 1994 had been an Islander, and so too had about half the 
councillors. Torres Shire was slowly changing and Islanders living on the islands 
which it serviced were becoming as supportive of it as those in the outlying 
communities were of the Island Councils. 
Islanders were also uncertain about the idea of opening up the regional 
representative body to non-Indigenous residents. The ICC and the TSRA 
represented only Indigenous residents of the Strait and kept other residents at a 
distance; Torres Shire was their avenue of representation. The change to a single 
general residential constituency for the proposed assembly would be a significant 
shift and Islanders were unsure about its possible implications. They wondered 
whether non-Islander interests might come to dominate the proposed assembly, 
as they had once dominated Torres Shire, and if numbers of non-Islanders were 
to grow whether the balance of power might change over time. They wondered 
about what safeguards there would or could be against such non-Indigenous 
population growth. 
A third area of uncertainty was the relationship between the proposed assembly 
and Islanders living on the mainland. In response to its third term of reference, 
HRSCATSIA suggested that the representation of these Islanders’ interests should 
remain within ATSIC, where they already had an Australia-wide Torres Straight 
Islander Advisory Board (TSIAB) in addition to a general right of regional council 
representation in the areas in which they resided. The chairperson of TSIAB 
could, HRSCATSIA suggested, be given ‘observer status’ on the proposed 
assembly in order to facilitate ‘links’ between Islanders living at home and away 
(HRSCATSIA 1997: 65). But this was hardly likely to appease Islanders living on 
the mainland, who wanted to get out of ATSIC altogether and also wanted far 
stronger links with the homeland.7 So another area of dissatisfaction and 
uncertainty about the HRSCATSIA proposal was also evident. 
In light of these reactions, the Commonwealth government’s official response to 
the HRSCATSIA report, in June 1998, was to support ‘in principle’ a ‘combined 
body’ to take over the ‘functions’ of the ICC and TSRA, but to leave in place the 
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Torres Shire (Government Response 1998: 4). In the euphemistic language of 
governments, this was in fact a significant disowning of the HRSCATSIA proposal. 
Even more telling was the ensuing comment that the Commonwealth ‘would want 
to see an effective process of consultation undertaken before any moves are made 
to change existing arrangements’ (Government Response 1998: 4). Three years 
on, and with very little happening, it is perhaps fair to say that the HRSCATSIA 
proposal for a Torres Strait assembly has effectively lapsed. There has still, 
however, been some interest among Islanders in progressing the autonomy issue. 
In March 1998, a group was formed comprising the chairpersons of the ICC and 
TSRA, the Mayor of Torres Shire and a number of other Islanders. In March 1999, 
referring to itself as the Torres Strait Autonomy Task Force, this group organised 
a three day meeting on autonomy on Thursday Island. Over a hundred Islanders 
attended, most from the Strait, but some also from the mainland. The group then 
attempted to carry out further consultations and to report to the ninth annual 
national Torres Strait Islander workshop held in October 1999. These workshops 
had, in the past, been dominated by Islanders living away from Torres Strait and 
had never, until 1999, been held in the Strait. Given the strength of feelings 
about autonomy however, a late decision was made to hold the ninth workshop 
on Thursday Island and it became perhaps the biggest meeting ever of Islanders 
living both in the Strait and away. The meeting was, in many ways, a national 
reunion for Torres Strait Islanders. But progress on the autonomy issue was slow, 
or perhaps even non-existent. There were too many unresolved issues, too few 
actual proposals, and insufficient structure for ideas about autonomy to be 
seriously progressed. The meeting was useful, in and of itself, in bringing 
Islanders together and in showing that they were still interested in autonomy. But 
it also showed that Islanders were having trouble articulating and resolving 
several sets of issues surrounding autonomy. We now turn to a discussion of 
some of these troubling issues under our three analytic headings. 
From whom? 
One basic question for any autonomy movement is: from whom is autonomy 
being sought? The answer, in the Torres Strait case, would seem to be from both 
the Australian Commonwealth and the Queensland State governments. Most of 
the engagement on autonomy over recent years has, however, been with 
Commonwealth instrumentalities, such as the HRSCATSIA inquiry. Engagement 
with the Queensland government has been notably lacking, which suggests some 
strategic lack of clarity in directing calls for autonomy and seeking constructive 
engagement. 
The official government response to the HRSCATSIA inquiry did include some 
statements from the Queensland government, as well as those from the 
Commonwealth. However, the Queensland government statements tended to be 
fairly negative, citing major ‘difficulties’ with the idea of the abolition of Torres  
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Shire and even ‘difficulties’ with the ‘amalgamation’ of the ICC and the TSRA 
(Government Response June 1998: 4–5). The points raised were legitimate 
concerns and suggested that the Queensland government ought to have been 
involved from the beginning in the design and conduct of a Torres Strait 
autonomy inquiry, rather than just in responding to one commissioned by the 
Commonwealth. Knowing that the autonomy they sought was as much from 
Queensland as from the Commonwealth, Torres Strait Islanders should never 
have supported a parliamentary inquiry commissioned solely by the 
Commonwealth. Some specially designed joint forum was required, if the 
autonomy issue was to be progressed. 
Another dimension of the ‘autonomy from whom’ question has been the 
involvement of the Torres Strait in ATSIC since 1990. Once Torres Strait had 
allowed itself to be drawn into ATSIC, much of the energy of the autonomy 
movement was then directed at getting out of ATSIC again. This has occurred 
slowly, with the formation of the TSRA under the ATSIC legislation in 1994, the 
granting to the TSRA of a one-line budget separate from that of ATSIC in 1997, 
and progress towards separate legislation for the TSRA outside the ATSIC 
legislation during 1999 and 2000. This has been a lengthy process which was not 
foreseen, or indeed necessary, at the time of the 1987 and 1988 calls for 
autonomy. During the HRSCATSIA inquiry, there were in fact more submissions 
from Islanders about getting out of ATSIC, than about any other form of 
autonomy (see Sanders & Arthur 1997: 1). Gaining autonomy from ATSIC has 
clearly been a major issue of the last decade, which has somewhat displaced the 
previous aim of gaining greater autonomy from the Commonwealth and 
Queensland governments. 
For Whom? 
The Torres Strait Islanders most dissatisfied with ATSIC are those living away 
from Torres Strait, who are directed to participate in ATSIC primarily through the 
regional councils in the areas in which they reside. They feel swamped, in these 
regions, by Aboriginal interests and also cut off from Islander interests in the 
Torres Strait homelands.8 The presence within ATSIC of TSIAB, the appointed 
Australia-wide Torres Strait Islander advisory structure, seems to do little to allay 
this dissatisfaction. Islanders living away from the Strait were the ones who made 
most submissions to the 1996–97 HRSCATSIA inquiry and the ones who wanted 
most strongly to ‘take the TSI out of ATSIC’ (see Sanders & Arthur 1997). But the 
position of these Islanders within ATSIC, and in relation to the Torres Strait, has 
not changed in ten years; nor did the HRSCATSIA inquiry have any good 
suggestions about how it could or should change. It has been Torres Strait 
Islanders living in the Strait who have been successful in ‘getting out’ of ATSIC 
over the last ten years, not those residing further south on the Australian 
mainland. 
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Table 1. Populations of Torres Strait Region, 1996 Census 
 
 
Locality 
Torres Strait 
Islander & 
Aboriginal (A)a 
 
 
Total (B) 
 
 
A/B % 
Inner Islands    
Thursday Island (Waiben):    
South side 795 1498 53.1 
North side 862 974 88.5 
Horn Island (Ngurapai) 274 476 57.6 
Prince of Wales Island (Muralug) 35 99 35.4 
Torres Shire sub-regional sub-total (1966) (3047) (64.5) 
Hammond Island (Keriri) (1 IC)b 192 201 95.5 
Sub-regional total 2158 3248 66.4 
Outer Islands    
North western group:    
Boigu (1 IC) 227 243 93.4 
Dauan (1 IC) 120 126 95.2 
Saibai (1 IC) 243 272 89.3 
Sub-regional total 590 641 92.0 
Western group:    
Badu (1 IC) 527 562 93.8 
Moa (2 ICs) 399 443 90.1 
Mabuiag (1 IC) 174 180 96.7 
Sub-regional total 1100 1185 92.8 
Central group:    
Masig, Kodal (Yorke Islands) (1 IC) 250 283 88.3 
Warraber (Sue Island) (1 IC) and    
Poruma (Coconut Island) (1 IC) 348 391 89.0 
Lama (Yam Island) (1 IC) (estimate) 150 150 100.0 
Sub-regional total 738 824 89.6 
Eastern gropu    
Mer, Waier, Dowar (Murray Islands) 
(1 IC) 
 
405 
 
414 
 
97.8 
Erub (Darnley Island) (1 IC) 204 225 90.7 
Ugar (Stephens Island) (1 IC) 86 92 93.5 
Sub-regional total 695 731 95.1 
Cape York Islander communities    
Bamaga (1 IC) 609 754 80.8 
Seisia (1 IC) 117 184 63.9 
Sub-regional total 726 938 77.4 
Regional totalc 6064 7615 79.6 
See notes on page opposite. 
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Tensions in the autonomy movement between Islanders living in Torres Strait and 
those living away are very real. Population growth, time since migration, and the 
relative numbers of Islanders now living away (see Fig. 2), all make it unrealistic 
to believe that Islanders could ever or would ever all return. But there is still a 
common sense of history and identity among Islanders, which gives those living 
away a strong claim to somehow be involved in Torres Strait affairs. Even 
Islanders living in the Strait do not wish to deny this claim, for it is the ‘oneness’ 
of Torres Strait Islanders which is a major part of their sense of being a cultural 
and political community within Australia, a ‘nation within’ as Indigenous 
communities within settler majority societies are increasingly being called. But 
Islanders living at home are apprehensive about the degree of influence Islanders 
living away could have on Torres Strait affairs, given their relative numbers. Not 
much imagination or inventiveness in institutional design has yet been applied to 
this difficult issue. The HRSCATSIA suggestion, of leaving mainland Islanders and 
TSIAB in ATSIC while allowing the chairperson of TSIAB observer status in the 
proposed regional assembly, was inevitably going to be unsatisfactory to 
mainland Islanders. Something far more innovative and imaginative will be 
required if the tension between mainland and homeland Islanders is to be 
mitigated, and we remain convinced that there are possibilities to be explored (see 
Sanders & Arthur 1997). 
Non-Indigenous people living in the Strait present another dimension of the 
question, autonomy for whom? This is particularly the case in the ‘inner’ island 
area covered by Torres Shire, where non-Indigenous people constitute up to a 
third of the total population (see Table 1). Some of these people are transient 
employees of both public and private sector organisations, with no particular 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: (a) The 1996 Census allowed Indigenous Australians to identify as Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander or 
both. Of the 6064 self-identifying Indigenous Australians in the Torres Strait region, 5396 (89.0%) 
identified as Torres Strait Islander, 304 (5.0%) identified as Aboriginal and 364 (6.0%) identified as both. 
In sub-regional terms, the numbers identifying as either Aboriginal or both were significantly above 
these averages: on Horn Island (Ngurapai) (8.4% Aboriginal, 12.0% both), on the south side of Thursday 
Island (Waiben) (5.2% Aboriginal, 13.6% both) and in Kubin community on the western side of Moa 
Island (2.2% Aboriginal, 19.4% both). This reflects the fact that Ngurapai and Waiben are regarded as 
traditional Kaurareg Aboriginal land, not Islander land, and that Kubin was used as a resettlement 
location for Kaurareg Aboriginal people during the years when colonial settlement was trying to 
minimise the numbers of Islanders and Aborigines on Thursday Island and to a lesser extent, on Horn 
Island. Small numbers of people who did not identify as Torres Strait Islander and/or Aboriginal also 
did not positively identify themselves as non-Indigenous. This ‘not-stated’ number constituted 5.3 per 
cent in the Torres Shire sub-region and 2.0 per cent elsewhere. If some of these are Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander, then the percentages of total populations that are Torres Strait Islander and/or 
Aboriginal could increase by up to these amounts. 
(b) IC = Island Council. 
(c) Regional totals are slightly greater than the sum of localities/sub-regions due to people counted as 
residents of the region who could not be allocated to a locality. 
Source: ABS Census of Population and Housing 1996. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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political or economic attachments to Torres Strait. But some are long time 
residents with strong attachments. Again not much imagination or inventiveness 
of institutional design has yet been applied to considering how to include these 
people in Torres Strait political structures—beyond Torres Shire—while also 
safeguarding Islander interests. HRSCATSIA’s insistence on a general residential 
constituency, not only for the proposed regional assembly but also for Island 
Councils, was again somewhat unhelpful (HRSCATSIA 1997: 52, 61). It left no 
room for manoeuvre over different periods or types of residence and it inflamed 
rather than allayed Islander fears of potential non-Indigenous domination. 
Ironically, in practice Torres Strait Islanders tend to acknowledge and respect the 
presence of long-term non-Islander residents, often saying that they too are now 
‘indigenous’. 
A final dimension of the ‘for whom?’ question has to do with the autonomy of 
individual islands and their existing Island Councils. As already noted, Island 
Councils have, on one account, enjoyed considerable autonomy and control over 
their individual island affairs since the late 1930s. In pre-colonial times also, 
individual islands were fairly fiercely independent. So it is perhaps not surprising 
that Islanders from particular islands and Island Councils are sometimes as 
much concerned with maintaining and enhancing their own island’s autonomy as 
they are with any centralised Torres Strait autonomy. Mer (Murray Island), in the 
far east of Torres Strait, has been particularly strong in this regard and has 
sometimes envisaged becoming a ‘territory’ in its own right (see submission 9 to 
the HRSCATSIA inquiry, 1996). The scale and number of individual islands and 
their populations (see Fig. 1 and Table 1), would make multiple island territories 
in Torres Strait difficult for either the Commonwealth or the Queensland 
governments to envisage or handle. However, the autonomy of individual islands 
within Torres Strait does need to be addressed and ensured, if overall autonomy 
for Torres Strait is to be achieved. It is significant that the March 1999 meeting of 
the Torres Strait Autonomy Task force declared its support for ‘a centralised, 
culturally appropriate governing structure’ for Torres Strait, while also seeking to 
‘maintain all existing local government structures and their responsibilities’ (Task 
Force 1999). 
For or over what? 
The final analytic question relates to the range of matters for or over which 
autonomy is being sought. The most common model appealed to is that of 
Territory status. Territories within Australian federalism typically have quite a 
high degree of control over areas such as health, education, policing, town 
planning, physical infrastructure, natural resource management and community 
services—areas which are often thought of as State-type concerns. Control over 
other matters such as taxation, income support, customs, immigration, defence 
and foreign policy, which are often thought of as Commonwealth-type concerns, is 
usually more restricted, although in particular circumstances it may be 
negotiable. 
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Torres Strait is a culturally and geographically distinct border region, and this 
provides the sort of circumstances in which it could be envisaged that control 
over some of these Commonwealth-type functions might be negotiated. Indeed 
there are already some quite particular and unusual Commonwealth 
jurisdictional arrangements in place for Torres Strait, which could be cited as 
precedents and built upon. Most of these arise from a treaty signed with Papua-
New Guinea in 1978, just three years after its grant of independence from 
Australia, and ratified in 1985. The Torres Strait Treaty kept the previously 
claimed islands and people of Torres Strait within Australia, up to the Papua-New 
Guinea coastline, but granted Papua-New Guinea sea-bed jurisdiction to a line 
near the middle of Torres Strait and a similar fisheries jurisdiction, except for an 
area stretching north to the three Australian inhabited islands north of this line 
(see Fig. 1). The Treaty also established a Torres Strait Protected Zone, covering 
some Papua-New Guinea islands and the ‘outer’ Torres Strait islands, in which 
free movement of people and conduct of activities, such as fishing, were permitted 
for traditional purposes. The Treaty thus established a relatively open border 
region with some degree of international movement and resource sharing. For 
ongoing management of issues, the Treaty also established a Joint Advisory 
Council reporting to the Australian and Papua New Guinea foreign ministers. 
Three of the nine Australian representatives on this Council must be Torres Strait 
Islander representatives, and by convention they have been elected Island Council 
chairpersons. These Torres Strait Treaty arrangements have thus given Torres 
Strait Islanders the beginnings of an ‘international personality’, which is one 
possible indicator of autonomy (Hannum & Lillich 1981). 
Initially, Torres Strait Islanders were enthusiastic about these treaty-based 
arrangements, seeing themselves as having a greater say on many 
Commonwealth functions than had previously been the case. However, over 
recent years Islanders have begun to express some dissatisfaction with the 
arrangements, particularly on marine issues (see Kaye 1994). In his 1993 Boyer 
lecture, Getano Lui spoke of Torres Strait Islanders living with the ‘effluents’ of 
‘international shipping’ and the ‘mines’ of Papua-New Guinea ‘swirling around in 
the waters from which we gain our daily food’ and of Islanders being ‘frustrated’ 
that although they believed the ‘islands, reefs and seas of Torres Strait’ to be 
theirs, they had ‘almost no power to manage or protect them’ or ‘ to receive the 
economic benefit they provide to others’ (Lui 1994: 62–3). This last was probably 
a reference to commercial fisherman, who operate legally in the waters of Torres 
Strait under Commonwealth and Queensland licensing arrangements, but with 
whom there have been some heated Islander clashes in recent years.9 
Islanders see the marine environment as central both to their life style and to 
economic development. This is hardly surprising given the pre-contact history of 
the area and the colonial experience of a buoyant pearling industry from the late 
1800s to the early 1960s (Altman, Arthur & Bek 1994; Ganter 1994; Mullins 
1995). If autonomy is to be progressed, therefore, it will almost certainly require 
some significant renegotiation of both Commonwealth and State jurisdictions 
relating to the marine environment and fisheries.10 Islanders will be seeking 
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significantly greater authority and control over matters concerning the marine 
environment and fisheries. Other more exclusively Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
such as immigration, customs, taxation, and income security might also be 
pushed towards renegotiation, but these are probably less central to the Torres 
Strait Islander sense of identity and history and the emerging Islander view of 
autonomy. 
Control over land is another central aspect of autonomy. Some progress on this 
front was made during the 1990s, following the recognition of native title in the 
Mabo judgement in 1992 and the passing of the Native Title Act by the 
Commonwealth Parliament in 1993. A number of difficult issues have arisen 
relating to native title in Torres Strait, such as relations between ‘historical’ 
Indigenous people who have moved to particular local areas within living memory 
and those whose associations go back far further. Progress has been made in 
resolving such issues and native title has now been recognised over several other 
islands in the Strait besides Mer. The native title claim and negotiation process, 
over land, will probably work its way to its conclusion over the next ten years and 
will itself have been a significant boost to Torres Strait autonomy. However, the 
potential of native title to advance autonomy in the all-important marine and 
fisheries area is, as yet, less clear.  
There are also other matters, besides land and marine issues, which need to be 
addressed in discussions of autonomy. Control and authority over predominantly 
State matters, such as school and technical education, hospitals and community 
health services, policing, public housing, infrastructure, and town planning may 
also need to be addressed and significantly renegotiated in any push towards 
greater autonomy for Torres Strait. Although these State-type matters are 
perhaps less central to the Islander sense of identity, history, economic 
development, and political community than matters relating to land and the 
marine environment, they are still clearly seen as important. A number of 
regionalised, Queensland-government consultative and administrative 
arrangements are already in place in these areas, but are often seen as 
inadequate by Islanders and as not giving them ultimate authority. No doubt 
these too would need to be renegotiated in a push towards greater Torres Strait 
autonomy. 
The small scale of Torres Strait operations in these State-type matters may lead a 
future Torres Strait government to seek linkages or service agreements with 
Queensland State government agencies. Service agreements are common between 
the small Australian island Territories and their neighbouring States, for example 
in the case of Cocos Keeling and Christmas islands and Western Australia. 
Similar service agreements between a Torres Strait territorial government and the 
Queensland State government would be a significant further step towards 
autonomy in these jurisdictional areas, replacing the current arrangements of 
regionalised, consultative Queensland State administration. 
The existing island Territories within the Australian system of government have 
all been acquired by the Commonwealth during the twentieth century and come 
under the Territories power at s. 122 of the Commonwealth of Australia 
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Constitution (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs 1991). This Constitution also specifies at s. 123 that if the 
Commonwealth wishes to ‘alter the limits’ of a State, it must do so ‘with the 
consent of the Parliament’ of that State and ‘the approval of the majority of the 
electors of the State’. For Torres Strait to become a Territory of the 
Commonwealth, there would have to be a Queensland-wide referendum. Whether 
Torres Strait would wish to pursue this path, and whether it would be able to 
interest the Queensland State government in such a referendum, is an issue 
which has not thus far been much raised or discussed in the autonomy debate. 
One alternative would be for Torres Strait to seek to become a territory of 
Queensland, rather than the Commonwealth, thus remaining a part of 
Queensland and not coming under the Commonwealth’s Territories power. Such a 
move would lessen the danger of creating animosity in a State government with 
whom a Torres Strait territory might then be seeking service linkages and 
agreements. Australian States do not, at present, have any such territories, but 
this is not to say that they cannot. A territory within a State would be a truly 
innovative development in Australian federal governance structures. 
Clearly these issues of the scope of autonomy relate very strongly back to those of 
autonomy from whom. Torres Strait Islanders would like to have more control and 
authority over existing jurisdictional responsibilities of both the Queensland State 
and Australian Commonwealth governments. But whether these two governments 
are willing to cede some of this control or authority has not yet been greatly 
explored. Being in a border region subject to an international treaty has, in one 
sense, already given Torres Strait Islanders a greater say in some matters than 
they might otherwise have been able to attain. But this geographic location may 
also set limits on the degree of control and authority which the Commonwealth, 
in particular, is willing to cede. The Queensland State government may also feel 
somewhat reluctant to cede authority, if only for reasons of hurt pride. Gaining 
greater autonomy is never an entirely easy or painless process. But this is no 
reason to stop trying, if current governance structures in Torres Strait are truly 
seen as inadequate. 
Autonomy, Australian federalism, and regional ethnic 
diversity: A concluding comment 
Cheryl Saunders has recently argued that Australian federalism has played ‘no 
role in moderating competing ethnic demands’ and that it has been ‘particularly 
unreceptive’ to the claims of Indigenous people (2000: 266, 284). There is, she 
argues, ‘a lack of a federal culture receptive to power sharing’ and also some 
‘dominant competing influences’ such as ‘majoritarian decision making, formal 
equality and parliamentary sovereignty’ (2000: 284, 269). More positively she 
argues that Australian federalism has played a role in addressing issues of 
geographic size; it offers ‘a more local level of government’ which contributes ‘at 
least potentially to Australian democracy’ (2000: 266). In Torres Strait, issues of 
ethnic diversity and geographic size come together; a small culturally distinctive 
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population based on a geographically distinctive region is making claims for 
greater autonomy. 
Saunders did not deal with the Torres Strait autonomy movement in her survey of 
the handling of Indigenous issues by Australian federalism over recent years. 
Perhaps if she had, she might have been a little less pessimistic about the 
capacity of Australian federalism to deal with ethnic or Indigenous claims, 
particularly where they are based in distinctive regions. Some observers have, for 
some time now, been more positive about the capacity of Australian federalism to 
respond to Islander claims and interests. Islanders have been seen to use the 
condominium of Australian governments interested in their affairs to increase 
their political leverage (Arthur 1999; Beckett 1987: 185–201; Sanders 1995: 522). 
Islanders have at times turned to the Commonwealth for attention and 
assistance, and at other times to Queensland. They have subtly played the two 
governments off against each other, while increasing their own demands or 
defending themselves against some unwanted Commonwealth or Queensland 
government plan. 
Torres Strait has not yet gained a degree of autonomy within Australian 
federalism which satisfies the protagonists of its autonomy movement. But it has 
made some progress towards greater autonomy and it is not primarily Australian 
federalism which has prevented it, or will prevent it, from making more. Islanders 
have a number of issues to sort out among themselves. They need to become 
much clearer about what it is they are seeking, from and for whom, and with 
whom they are seeking strategic engagements. Some recent accounts, contra 
Saunders, would suggest that Australian federalism does indeed have a quite 
strong ‘power sharing’ culture and that State and Commonwealth governments 
can indeed find collaborative and cooperative ways to work together on issues, if 
they are pushed to (for many examples see Painter 1998). Torres Strait Islanders 
perhaps need first to develop their own position and then to approach the 
Queensland and Commonwealth governments in tandem, if they are going to 
advance the autonomy issue. Using one government to protect yourself from 
another, while taking what you can from each, is one form of federal politics at 
which Torres Strait Islanders have excelled in recent years. But there are also 
times when collaboration rather than competition between the Commonwealth 
and a State government is required, and this may be such a time in relation to 
Torres Strait autonomy. These are strategic issues on which judgments can differ, 
but also on which judgments should be open to change. 
The Torres Strait autonomy movement has not yet reached a settlement which is 
likely to satisfy Islander protagonists. It is unlikely, therefore that it will simply 
fade away. There is still much work to be done. Australian federalism can 
accommodate political claims arising from regional ethnic diversity, but it needs 
to be pushed to do so. If the Torres Strait autonomy issue is ever to be fully 
resolved, real innovation will be called for within Australian federal governance. 
 
Notes 
1. As well being restricted to Indigenous people, this is a far more stringent residential 
criteria than for general Queensland local government, which only requires a person 
to have three months residence in an area in order to have the right to stand for office. 
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2. The number of Island Councils increased to 17 in the late 1940s when Islanders from 
north western islands, particularly Saibai, resettled on the tip of Cape York at the new 
communities of Bamaga and Seisia. Saibai, which is a delta island, had at the time 
experienced major flooding. 
3. Mabo’s case was initially a claim for particular parcels of land for particular 
individuals. However, in the end it was dealt with as a claim for the whole of Mer on 
behalf of the all the Meriam. 
4. Kehoe-Forutan makes the point that in 1987 the ICC recruited an Islander who had 
been residing on the mainland for many years to work with their Independence 
Working Party Committee and who ‘whether he realized it or not, was bringing with 
him to the political scene in the Islands, a very different political background and 
experience’. The result, she argues, was a shedding by Islander leaders of the ‘normal 
diplomatic approach’ in favour of greater ‘utilization of the media’ (Kehoe-Forutan 
1988: 17). 
5. ATSIC initially had 60 regions, of which Torres Strait was one. In 1993, this was 
reduced to 36, but Torres Strait region remained as previously delineated. ATSIC 
regions are aggregated into 17 zones, each of which has a national Commissioner. 
Torres Strait is one of just four ATSIC regions which is also a zone and hence has its 
own national Commissioner. Most ATSIC zones are currently comprised of two or 
three regions. 
6. The centre of colonial settlement was on the southern side of Thursday Island. When 
Islanders were allowed to settle on Thursday Island from around the middle of the 
twentieth century, an area on the northern side of the island known as Tamwoy was 
set aside for them as a reserve. 
7. Dissatisfaction with ATSIC among Torres Strait Islanders living on the mainland is 
based on a perception that their interests within ATSIC within their residential regions 
are dominated by the more numerous Aboriginal Indigenous people. Australia-wide 
Torres Strait Islanders constitute approximately 10 per cent of the total Indigenous 
population, though in many of ATSIC’s 36 regions they are far less than this. In a few 
regions around Cairns and Townsville in North Queensland the proportion of 
Indigenous people identifying as Torres Strait Islander rises to a quarter, or even 
more, but is still a minority. Only in the Torres Strait are Torres Strait Islanders a 
majority Indigenous population, where they constitute about 95 per cent of the 
Indigenous-identifying population and 75 per cent of the total residential population 
(see Sanders & Arthur 1997: 7; Table 1). Studies of this perceived domination of 
interests have had trouble finding hard evidence (Arthur 1998), but the perception is 
certainly strong among mainland Islanders. 
8. See note 7. 
9. One Islander, Ali Nona, was recently acquitted of armed robbery charges as a result of 
such a clash. He defended his right to take the fish from the commercial fisherman by 
referring to his traditional right to local fisheries. 
10. Fisheries in the Torres Strait have since 1986 been managed as a joint 
Commonwealth–Queensland jurisdiction by a Torres Strait Protected Zone Joint 
Authority comprised of the Queensland and Commonwealth fisheries ministers. The 
Fisheries Management Committee of this authority has three Islander representatives, 
three members representing the Queensland Commercial Fishing Organisation, two 
Queensland government and two Commonwealth government members, and one 
scientific member.  
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